



This paper concerns the account of Dasein’s existence that Heidegger gives us 
in Being and Time, and exactly what kind of account it is. I will argue that, de-
spite his emphatic insistence to the contrary, it should be read as a philosophical 
anthropology because it gives an account of human existence and its structures. 
Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is at its most productive and interesting when 
understood this way, and the reasons he gives for its being essentially different 
from philosophical anthropology are unconvincing. Heidegger took great pains 
to distance his work from philosophical anthropology, repeatedly claiming in 
numerous texts throughout his career that to understand it as such is a mistake. 
It is not a mistake: his ‘analytic of Dasein’ has great potential to benefit the phil-
osophical-anthropological project and constitutes a powerful attempt to describe 
human existence and account for how it is structured. This can be evidenced in 
many ways, given the breadth and depth of Being and Time, but here I will focus 
on its analysis of moods.
To begin with, however, I will have to discuss anthropology and explain how 
philosophical anthropology differs from it. I claim that anthropology’s general 
concern is with giving accounts of specific human societies and understanding 
human differences. A noble project to be sure, but not the project of the philo-
sophical anthropologist. Where anthropology is preoccupied with specificity and 
difference, philosophical anthropology is concerned with commonality, with 
what is universal, necessary and constitutive for human existence in general. 
Anthropologists pursue questions about, for example, what Balinese people and 
Balinese society are like,1 or what primitive societies are like and what concepts 
should be used to describe them.2 Philosophical anthropology takes place at a 
more abstract level, pondering what being a human is like, and what is involved in 
1  As Clifford Geertz famously does, in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973).
2  There are numerous examples of such research. Some examples would be Bronislaw Ma-
linowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) and Pierre Clastres’ Society Against the State 
(1972). An example of the more conceptual reflection can be found in Edward Dozier, The 
Concepts of “Primitive” and “Native” in Anthropology (1955).
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living a human existence. This discussion will lead me onto Heidegger’s con-
ception of his project, and how he frames it as a critique of and distancing from 
both anthropology and philosophical anthropology.
Heidegger claims he is giving an account of Dasein and that, because his pro-
ject is motivated by more fundamental ideas and concerned with a different top-
ic, his project cannot be philosophical anthropology. It is rather a “fundamental 
ontology,” concerned with Being in general, not with any particular type or group 
of particular beings, like “human beings”. Philosophical anthropology, in his 
terms, would amount to a “regional ontology,” accounting for this specific region 
of beings, not Being in general.3 But the method Heidegger uses for his inves-
tigation raises serious questions about whether this is really the case. As we will 
see, central to Heidegger’s proposed method for answering the question of the 
meaning of Being is the giving of an account of the existence of the only entity 
that could ask, understand and answer this question. If we want to answer the 
question of Being, some kind of account is needed of the questioner’s kind of 
existence and how this existence gives rise to its ability to ask, understand and 
answer questions. Only then could we really know what answering this question 
would consist in, since it is only through and out of this kind of existence that 
the question could even potentially be answered. The nature and structure of 
this existence, therefore, is something should be thoroughly clarified before-
hand.
The entity in question, Heidegger famously calls Dasein – not “the human 
being”. This is because even though human beings are Dasein, being Dasein is 
not necessarily limited to human beings – there may be other entities that could 
understand, ask and answer the question of Being, whose existence may be 
bound by similar structures to ours. According to Heidegger, when he analyses 
Dasein’s existence, this means he is engaged in something more fundamental 
than and essentially different to philosophical anthropology, because he is pre-
cisely not giving an account of human existence, but one of Dasein. Crucially, 
though, anything that truly applies to Dasein applies truly to human beings, because 
human beings are Dasein. To give an account of Dasein, therefore, just is to give 
one of human existence, and so at the very least involves and produces a kind of 
philosophical anthropology.
Examining Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s moods is a potential way (of 
which there are many) that we might see this to be the case. Heidegger gives 
an interesting analysis of moods that perhaps improves on some previous treat-
ments of the affective dimension of human beings, and perhaps manages to 
state true things about this dimension. Heidegger casts moods as “fundamental-
ly disclosive”, as being integrally involved with our making sense of the world 
3  Heidegger capitalizes ‘Being’ when he is referring to being in general. Since this may be 
of help in understanding some passages, I will sometimes do the same.
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and our disclosure of the meaning of things in it. They don’t just reveal ‘how 
we are doing’, they play a part in the disclosure of various important aspects of 
our existence. They are part of the process by which we disclose of objects as 
meaningful, it is through them that insights about our being as a whole can be 
disclosed to us, and they are also revealing of an aspect of our condition that 
Heidegger calls “thrownness”. Now, we do not have to agree with everything 
Heidegger says about moods, and my sketch of his account of them will be lim-
ited. But we do not have to examine what he says in too much detail to realise 
that his work constitutes an account of human existence, even if this is not all 
that it does. If Heidegger managed to say anything true of Dasein, he managed 
to say something true of humans. His account is therefore (at least partially) a 
philosophical anthropology, and is especially productive when read as one.
I. ANTHROPOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Before we can get to why Heidegger’s work should be understood as a philo-
sophical anthropology, we have to understand what this is and how it differs 
from “regular” anthropology. In a 1929 text, Heidegger gives what I think is a 
fair definition of anthropology:
Anthropology means the science of man. It embraces all that is knowable relative to 
the nature of man. […] Within the domain of anthropology […] falls not only man’s 
human qualities which, because they are at hand, are discernible and distinguish this 
determinate species from animals and plants, but also his latent abilities, the differ-
ences according to character, race and sex. (Heidegger 1973. 146.)
Anthropology is the academic discipline which studies human beings from var-
ious perspectives and aims for scientific rigour in doing so. Because human be-
ings have many different aspects, they offer many different phenomena worthy 
of study, and anthropology not only studies how human beings are distinct from 
animals, but also how they are distinct from one another along biological, soci-
etal, racial and sexual lines. Anthropology scientifically studies human beings 
from various perspectives which adopt different practises with varying scopes 
of enquiry. Over time, the discipline has broken down into (roughly) four main 
categories: cultural, social, linguistic and biological. I will give a brief sketch 
of these now, and it will necessarily be limited. However, it will be enough to 
notice anthropology’s salient focusses and how the discipline differs from phil-
osophical anthropology.
Cultural anthropology analyses particular cultures, usually on their own terms 
and without necessarily comparing them to others. A cultural anthropologist 
might examine historical evidence in order to compile a theory about, for ex-
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ample, what ancient Egyptian culture was like, or the culture of Renaissance 
France. Social anthropologists attempt something similar, but tend to avoid the 
term ‘culture’ because the object of their study is better captured as the analysis 
and comparison of social relations around the world. Where cultural anthropol-
ogists may be interested in a particular culture in general, social anthropology 
focusses on the social relations in a given society – so while the topics that might 
interest social and cultural anthropologists can be very similar, the approach they 
take is slightly different, as are the conceptual lenses they use. Linguistic an-
thropology analyses and compares human language and catalogues information 
about them across the world and throughout history. Biological anthropology 
analyses the biological basis of human beings, either in terms of its evolutionary 
history or its modern manifestations.4
With this admittedly cursory glance at anthropology in hand, I think we can 
notice something about its salient focus – in its analysis of human beings, an-
thropology is concerned with specificity and difference. Anthropological studies are 
almost always concerned with giving accounts of specific, particular societies at 
specific points in history, or with comparing societies and their structures. Be 
it through historical analyses, biological investigation or ethnographic research 
which describes first-hand experiences, anthropologists attempt to understand 
human societies in their historical specificity, and has amassed a wealth of in-
formation to this end. As we understand more and more about what particular 
human societies are like, we naturally understand more about how they compare 
to one another and what the differences are between them. The preoccupa-
tion with human differences has not gone unnoticed by certain anthropologists. 
Conrad Phillip Kottak, for instance, named one of his books Anthropology: The 
Exploration of Human Diversity. (Kottak 1997) Ruth Benedict, in her study on 
Japanese culture, wrote that the “tough-minded” anthropologist’s “goal is a 
world made safe for human differences” (Benedict 2005. 15). Clyde Kluckhohn 
wrote similarly: “anthropology provides a scientific basis for dealing with the 
crucial dilemma of the world today: how can peoples of different appearances, 
mutually unintelligible languages and dissimilar ways of life get along peaceably 
together?” (Kluckhohn 1949. 1). By understanding what specific societies are 
like, we can also get an understanding of how these societies and peoples differ 
from one another, and understanding human differences is crucial to being able 
to live peacefully in spite of them.
It is on this point of specificity and differences that we can delineate the 
project of philosophical anthropology, which I understand to be the other side 
of anthropology’s coin. Rather than focussing on specific societies and human 
4  I have not mentioned archaeology here, although it is sometimes said to be a kind of an-
thropology. Certainly it is involved in the investigation of human cultures and often provides 
historical evidence for anthropologists to use in their investigations.
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differences, philosophical anthropology attempts to find commonality in all in-
stances of the human experience, what is universal, necessary and constitutive 
for human existence regardless of which society a person lives in. Naturally, 
this inquiry can take many forms. Philosophical anthropologists aim to specify 
and elucidate the structures of human existence, which often takes the form of 
searching for essential and unique features of human beings, or non-essential 
and non-unique ones that are just particularly important. Their analysis, there-
fore, could potentially take place from almost any perspective within philoso-
phy: metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and so on – all of 
these areas of inquiry could involve or lead to the giving of some kind of account 
of human existence, and so could be philosophical-anthropological in nature, 
even if this is not what they are concerned with doing all the time. Whatever 
method taken, or perspective inquired from, philosophical anthropology gives 
an account of the universal, necessary and constitutive structures of human ex-
istence, considering what it is like to live a human life. Heidegger therefore 
defines it also quite adequately when he says that philosophical anthropology 
is “an essential consideration of the human being […] thereby to work out the 
specific, essential composition of this determinate region of beings. Philosophi-
cal anthropology therefore becomes a regional ontology of human beings” (Hei-
degger 1973. 148). However, for technical reasons related to his own project, 
this is exactly what he wants to distinguish himself from, and it is in this notion 
of a “regional ontology” and his delineation of his own project as “fundamental 
ontology” that we can see why.
II. WHAT IS FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY?
Heidegger argued that his project is one of “fundamental ontology”, which 
makes it essentially different to philosophical anthropology because funda-
mental ontology is singularly concerned with the question of the meaning of Being. 
This question was the heart and soul of Heidegger’s entire career and he was 
convinced that his project, being motivated and oriented in this way, meant 
that he could not be doing philosophical anthropology – he was, by his own 
estimation, engaged in something different and far more fundamental. He had 
no time for those who misunderstood this, especially in his infamous private 
“black notebooks” where he wrote, for example, that “if the question of being 
had been grasped, even if only in a crude way […] then Being and Time could not 
have been misinterpreted and misused as an anthropology” (Heidegger 2016. 
16). He goes even further elsewhere: “anthropology is the preventive measure 
instituted by modern humanity in consequence of which the human being ar-
rives at not wanting to know who he is” (Heidegger 2017a. 18). Heidegger even 
calls a writer who was influenced by his work (Otto Bollnow) a “philistine” for 
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“tak[ing] it as settled that Being and Time is a philosophical anthropology” (Hei-
degger 2017b. 170). These are just a selection of many examples, public and 
private, of Heidegger making such criticisms: it was a persistent problem for him 
that people “misunderstood” his work in this way, and one he could not have 
been clearer about wanting to repudiate.
Perhaps in the context of his career, and the project of Being and Time, Hei-
degger’s exasperation is somehow understandable. After all, it goes to the very 
heart of his work and the kind of sweeping criticisms he constantly made about 
basically every significant philosopher of the Western tradition except himself. 
Those familiar with Heidegger will no doubt have examples of this in mind: he 
often, repeatedly claimed that philosophers, from Plato to Aristotle, Descartes 
to Kant, Hegel and beyond, had all been somehow mistaken, however valiant 
their efforts. Why? Because they failed to adequately address the question of the 
meaning of Being – the most important question of them all. Heidegger often 
referred to it as the “grounding-question”, such as here, where he is also talking 
about misinterpreting his work as anthropology: “this misinterpretation is basi-
cally excluded […] if from the beginning we hold on to the grounding-question 
of the meaning of being as the only question” (Heidegger 1999. 60).
But why is this question so important? Being is fundamental to everything 
we do, every sentence that we speak, everything that is, but “we do not know 
what ‘Being’ means. […] we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though 
we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies” (Heidegger 1962. 25). 
But without a proper understanding of the meaning of Being, how can we do 
philosophy? Not knowing what Being means will necessarily have an impact 
on philosophers (or indeed anyone) and their conception of anything because 
“basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding before-
hand of subject-matter […] [and] all positive investigation is guided by this un-
derstanding” (Heidegger 1962. 30). The concepts a subject works with guides 
how inquiry within it takes place and provides a framework for it. In philosophy, 
terms like ‘mind’ and ‘body’, and our understanding of them, provide a realm 
in which certain questioning and inquiry can take place. But ‘Being’, the most 
fundamental and universal concept, is implicated in every other – and we have 
no idea what it means. Just as you cannot teach a class without doing the 
necessary preparation, philosophers cannot expect to talk coherently about 
the nature of the mind, knowledge, goodness, truth, beauty or reality without 
working out or solving the question of the meaning of Being. In a nutshell, 
Heidegger’s critique of the history of philosophy is that philosophers have 
been trying to run before they can walk. They have not done the requisite 
preparatory work, and their level of analysis was not fundamental enough for 
doing the things they wanted to do.
In the introduction to Being and Time (Heidegger 1962. 21–63), Heidegger 
lays out the first step in his program for overcoming this error – an “analytic” of 
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the being of what he calls Dasein. When we think about what Being is, we realise 
that Being is always the being of an entity – nothing can be if it has no Being. So 
if we are to find out what Being is, we should look to entities and analyse them. 
But not just any entity will do: it’s hard to imagine what a rock or a table could 
tell us about the meaning of Being, beyond the fact that for something to exist it 
must have Being. But there is a special type of entity that would give us a better 
clue, “an entity which does not just occur among other entities” (Heidegger 
1962. 32) like tables or rocks do, but which has a different, unique kind of Being 
that other entities do not. This type of entity does not just exist, but has a rela-
tionship of concern towards its existence. Its being “is an issue for it” (Heidegger 
1962. 32), something that concerns it, something it must deal with. It is the only 
entity that we know of that can raise the question of the meaning of Being, and 
which has “certain ways of behaving that are constitutive for our inquiry” (BT 
26) into it. To inquire into anything, there must be an inquirer that is capable 
of certain things, like “looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, 
choosing” (Heidegger 1962. 26) – but surely also asking and answering ques-
tions. The entity that Heidegger is describing, “those particular entities which 
we, the inquirers, are ourselves” (Heidegger 1962. 26–27) he calls Dasein. The 
question of the meaning of Being, the inquiry into it and the potential answering 
of it, is something that arises from and is made possible by the Being of Dasein. 
In pursuing this question, therefore, it is fundamental that we know what this 
being consists in such that we can, from out of this being, ask, understand and 
perhaps answer our guiding question. In short, “to work out the question of 
Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his 
own Being” (Heidegger 1962. 27). To understand the question of the meaning 
of Being, we must first understand ourselves.5
The failure to conduct the right kind of analysis of our way of Being, specifi-
cally to prepare for the grounding-question, is what philosophers have neglected 
to do historically. According to Heidegger, this is the requisite preparatory work 
they have not done. He even at times calls his proposed analytic a “preparatory 
fundamental analysis” (Heidegger 1962. 65) of Dasein. ‘Preparatory’ not just 
because it prepares us for answering the grounding-question, or because the 
analysis will later be deepened in terms of time (Heidegger 1962. Division 2), 
but because once complete, this ontological analysis will prepare us for conduct-
5  It is worth noticing (though not directly relevant) just how Kantian a move this is, recall-
ing Kant’s list of the four questions that unite philosophy. “What can I know? What should I 
do? What may I hope?” (Kant 1998. 677.) Kant’s insight is that these questions imply a fourth 
that must be answered first: what is the human being? What is the nature of the being doing 
the knowing, acting and hoping? This leads Kant to conceive of philosophy anthropologically, 
and of its most fundamental questions as anthropological in nature. Heidegger makes exactly 
the same move with respect to the question of Being and Dasein.
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ing philosophy in an appropriate, grounded fashion. To this end, Heidegger 
will concertedly avoid traditional philosophical vocabulary. Terms like ‘subject’, 
‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, ‘person’ or ‘human being’ have little to no place in the 
analytic of Dasein, except to be criticised. Dasein, on Heidegger’s account, is 
conceived essentially differently and in a new way from previous philosophical 
conceptions of the human being, and the introduction of ‘Dasein’ as a term also 
functions as a kind of cleansing of the philosophical palate, freeing us from any 
preconceptions of the entity to be analysed.
Heidegger’s conception of his project, and the way he carries it out, involves a 
clear division: anthropology studies human beings, fundamental ontology stud-
ies Dasein. The focus, method, subject and scope of these inquiries, accord-
ing to Heidegger, are so different and removed from one another that to study 
Dasein is to do something essentially different from simply studying human 
beings. Fundamental ontology, therefore, is not philosophical anthropology. In 
what follows, I will take a specific aspect of the analytic of Dasein – its account 
of moods – and show that the division Heidegger draws between his project and 
philosophical anthropology does not hold.
III. HEIDEGGER’S ACCOUNT OF MOODS
It is always worth bearing in mind when discussing the analytic of Dasein that 
its analysis is a phenomenological one: it tries to describe what it is like to ex-
perience being Dasein and elucidate the structures necessary for this kind of 
experience to arise. It is a constant invitation to compare its analysis with one’s 
own experience – and moods are a particularly important part of our experience 
of our existence. From how Heidegger discusses moods, I think it is clear that 
what he is talking about would include what we might normally call emotions. 
Some of the moods he discusses include fear (Heidegger 1962. §30), which he 
conceives as having many variations that can be identified with other emotional 
states, like dread, terror, timidity and shyness (Heidegger 1962. 182). He fa-
mously discusses anxiety, in Being and Time and What is Metaphysics? especially, 
where he also mentions joy as another example of mood (Heidegger 1998. 87). 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, he analyses boredom as a particularly 
important mood akin to anxiety. Our focus here will be on the general account 
Heidegger gives of moods in Being and Time, but it is worth bearing in mind that 
his use of ‘mood’ is very broad, and encompasses a large variety of affective phe-
nomena and, based on the moods he explicitly discusses, would quite plausibly 
include what we normally call ‘emotions’. But given that Heidegger speaks of 
moods as affective states we can find ourselves in that determine our way of 
being disposed to the world at a given time, ‘mood’ is quite an apt word for what 
he is talking about.
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Heidegger’s analysis of moods speaks about them in terms of Befindlichkeit 
and Stimmung, which I have opted to translate as ‘disposedness’ and ‘mood’, 
respectively.6 They are intimately related, and defined in terms of each other 
as follows:
What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘disposedness’ is ontically the most familiar 
and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our being-attuned. […] it is necessary to see this 
phenomenon as a fundamental existentiale (Heidegger 1962. 172).
Disposedness and mood, in Heidegger’s framework, are examples of what he 
calls existentiale structures. These are phenomena of Dasein’s existence that are 
universal, necessary and constitutive for it: they are present in every instance 
of Dasein, and play a part in making its existence the way it is. If they were to 
taken out of Dasein’s existence, it would be a different entity entirely. ‘Dis-
posedness’ refers to Dasein’s capacity to be disposed, or ‘attuned’ some way 
towards it existence, in such a way that its existence and the things in it matter 
to it. Dasein is always disposed like this in some way towards its existence, and 
there are many ways we can be so disposed. The different ways Dasein can be 
disposed to its existence, the various possible manifestations of disposedness, 
Heidegger identifies as moods. In saying that moods are an existentiale struc-
ture, Heidegger is simply saying that all Daseins have moods, that moods play a 
part in structuring every Dasein’s existence, and if we took away our moods we 
would no longer be the same entity. Without moods, our experience would be 
fundamentally different. Moods, being the manifestations of our disposedness, 
are what allow us to be disposed to the world and our existence in various ways. 
But how exactly is it that moods work, and how do they let us be disposed in 
different ways to our existence? Following Heidegger’s answer to this question 
will allow us to view, in detail, Heidegger’s most important claims about moods, 
and how they can be understood as contributing to the project of philosophical 
anthropology.
The aspects of Heidegger’s account I will be focussing on are the following:
(1) Moods are fundamentally disclosive.
(2) Moods disclose our thrownness.
(3) Certain moods disclose our being-in-the-world as a whole.7
6  There is debate over how these terms (especially Befindlichkeit) should be translated, 
but I will not go into that here. Debating the translation of these terms is not necessary to 
understand the general claims Heidegger makes about the phenomena he is discussing, and 
would distract from the point. For an indication of the depth of disagreement on this, William 
Blattner has provided a helpful compilation of various ways that Heidegger’s terms have been 
translated (https://faculty.georgetown.edu/blattnew/heid/Heidegger-jargon.html).
7  Heidegger also claims that moods let things matter to us, but since this is perhaps un-
convincing, not as interesting as the first three claims and not necessary to consider for the 
purpose of my argument, I will leave it aside.
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Heidegger casts moods as fundamentally disclosive, meaning that their basic 
function is to disclose things, to reveal information to us about the world and 
things in it, and this process happens on a more fundamental level than cogni-
tion, reason and knowing.8 A simple way to understand how moods can be fun-
damentally disclosive is to consider perhaps the most intuitive thing that moods 
reveal to us, expressed by Heidegger as follows: “a mood makes manifest ‘how 
one is, and how one is faring’.” (Heidegger 1962. 173) Moods are states we find 
ourselves in that let us know how we are doing, what our general affective state 
is – ‘I am happy’, ‘I am bored’, etc. and the mood I am in determines how I ex-
perience my existence and the things I encounter in it, at that time. Moods give 
us an emotional context through which to experience our existence, affecting 
our perception of the things in it. If I am happy, I will be more likely to experi-
ence certain things (or people) as joyful, or uplifting, rather than as annoying, or 
angering. In their disclosure of ‘how we are doing’, moods provide an affective 
setting for our experience to take place in, which alters our experience of our 
world depending on what mood we are in, and constitutes an integral part of our 
making sense of our environment.
This is where the idea of “fundamental disclosure” really comes into play, 
because moods do not just disclose “how we are doing” – everything in our ex-
perience is disclosed to us through some mood or another since we are never 
un-mooded, and this disclosure takes place on a more fundamental level than 
reason, cognition and knowing. These things have often been taken to be the 
primary way we engage with and relate to the world, but on Heidegger’s account 
moods operate “prior” to these things and “beyond their range of disclosure” 
(Heidegger 1962. 175). This is because even before we can reason, deduce, 
know (etc.), we have moods, and we still make some kind of meaningful sense 
of our world, we just do so in a non-linguistic and pre-reflective way. Babies, 
even though they cannot talk, or think philosophically, still make some kind of 
sense of the things around them, and things are still disclosed as having some 
sort of significance, even if this significance is diminished in comparison to what 
it might be for an adult. Babies still have moods, and these moods still disclose 
things as significant to them, even if the level of disclosure only occurs in terms 
of pleasantness or unpleasantness, or of liking or disliking a particular toy, thing, 
or food, etc. But this is true of all moods no matter what age we are – they dis-
8  This is perhaps beside the point here, but this is much that could be said about how 
Heidegger’s account of moods overturns some traditional conceptions of human affectivity, 
where moods are understood as “internal, subjective mental states […] caused by one’s exter-
nal situation” (Elpidorou–Freeman 2015. 664). Furthermore, Heidegger’s account of moods 
is a fundamental rejection of a certain way of conceiving our connection to the world that 
many philosophers have adopted over the centuries, where the primary way we connect with 
our world is through reason, rationality and knowing. For Heidegger, these things are made 
possible by a more fundamental and pre-reflective engagement with our environment, of 
which moods are an integral part.
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close things to us, and do so on a level different to that of rational disclosure. 
Think again of how moods disclose ‘how we are doing’ – this is not something 
we reason ourselves into, or find out by way of thinking. It is something that is 
revealed to us experientially, non-linguistically, and unreflectively – we find 
ourselves in a state. This is what Heidegger means when he says that moods 
are fundamentally disclosive: they reveal information to us about ourselves, our 
worlds and the things in them on an existentially prior level to rationality, and 
play a part in enabling rationality. Without the pre-reflective familiarity with the 
world that we have before we can reason, reason would not be possible. Moods 
are an integral part of our most fundamental way of making sense of the world, 
and play an important role in how things are disclosed to us as meaningful in the 
first place. We perceive and understand things, they have a certain place in our 
world, and moods partly constitute the process by which we apprehend them, 
and disclose them as meaningful.
But moods disclose other things apart from our general affective state, or 
things in the world. They are also said by Heidegger to “disclose Dasein in its 
thrownness” (Heidegger 1962. 175) and, in certain cases, disclose insight about 
our being-in-the-world as such. Heidegger’s notion of ‘throwness’ is perhaps 
best approached with a quote from Kierkegaard, talking about life: “no one asks 
when one wants to come in; no one asks when one wants to go out” (Kierkegaard 
1987. 26). Our existence is something that is forced upon us, unchosen, but 
we have to deal with it – we are “thrown” into the world and burdened with 
the responsibility of existing. We do not decide to be born, and our lives are 
tinged by the fact that we know we will one day die – how our existence begins 
and ends is something we have no control over, and this is also the case with 
many things along the way. This renders our existence, in some sense, quite 
strange, difficult, or even absurd, and it is this unchosen, disquieting aspect of 
our predicament that Heidegger refers to as Dasein’s “thrownness […] [which] 
is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over” (Heidegger 1962. 
174) to its existence.
Interestingly, Heidegger claims that it is through moods that our thrownness 
is revealed to us, and gives at least two reasons for this. We have already seen 
how moods are a constitutive part of how we make sense of the world in our 
most primal way. The mood is what “brings Dasein before the ‘that-it-is of its 
‘there’” (Heidegger 1962. 175), allowing us to make sense of the world and the 
things in it. If our thrownness is something that is disclosed to us, moods must 
therefore play a part in its disclosure by definition – if thrownness is a part of 
our existence that we can encounter and make meaningful sense of, our moods 
must at least partially constitute the process of its disclosure to us. The second 
reason we can draw from Heidegger as to why moods disclose thrownness has 
more to do with the experience of being in a mood: there is a similarity between 
thrownness and moods as we experience them. Just as we do not choose to be 
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thrown into the world, we do not really choose to be in a particular mood or an-
other: “a mood assails us” (Heidegger 1962. 176). I do not choose to enter a bad 
mood, nor do I choose to be in a happy one – there is no switch that we can turn 
on and off when it comes to our mood. We can do certain things that might affect 
it, such as putting on a depressing film, or eating a delicious meal, but we cannot 
directly choose to change our mood, and force our body and mind to adapt to 
our preferred mood, or preferred degree of mood. Even if I know that putting on 
Roman Polanksi’s The Pianist will make me sad, I have no control over how sad 
I will be, or which particular variety or degree of sadness I will feel – this is be-
yond my control, and I am ‘thrown’ into it, like I am thrown into my existence.
In certain special cases of mood, existential insights about our being-in-the-
world as such are disclosed to us. Heidegger famously identified anxiety (Angst) 
as an example of this.9 Rather than disclosing particular items or sets of items 
in the world, anxiety (or at least a specific variety of it) is a rare case of mood 
that can disclose the totality of our world to us. This is because the experience in-
volved in them is one of a total change of the structure of our world as we normally 
experience it. Normally, our worlds and everything in them are invested with and 
seen in the light of significance, with our moods disclosing the objects in them as 
significant in a particular way. When afraid, for example, we are always afraid of 
particular things. These things are disclosed as having a meaning, and being wor-
thy of fear. But “that in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite”, 
not an object at all but “the world as such” (Heidegger 1962. 231). Heideggerian 
anxiety is a phenomenon where we completely withdraw from our usual world. 
We become so paralysed by the weight of our anxiety that we temporarily fail to 
make sense of the world as we normally do - things become insignificant to us. In 
such a state, we view the world from a completely different perspective, which 
tells us what it is otherwise always like to be in one. Elsewhere, Heidegger calls 
this a ‘telling refusal’ (Heidegger 1995. 137) – in temporarily and totally refusing 
itself, the nature of the world announces itself more forcefully.
This is why anxiety is an encounter with “Dasein’s innermost freedom” (Hei-
degger 1995. 136). What we are anxious about in such states is not a particular 
thing, or set of things, but the weight of our freedom as such. We become so 
overwhelmed by our possibilities that we are left dumbstruck, paralysed before 
our world and our freedom. But in such a state, where the usual character of 
the world – as structured by significance – announces itself, we are afforded a 
unique insight into our role within it. We are the beings that are responsible for 
the creation, maintenance and inhabiting of the very significance of our worlds. 
Who wouldn’t feel anxious upon realising this for the first time? It is an unset-
tling experience, but one that forcibly confronts Dasein with its “Being-free for 
9  Less famously but just as interestingly, he also identifies boredom as one, but I will focus 
on anxiety here for considerations of space.
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the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself” (Heidegger 1962. 232). 
Anxiety functions as a powerful existential catalyst for being able authentically 
seize hold of our lives, and appreciate more forcefully and authentically our role 
as free creators and keepers of significance.
IV. HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF MOODS
We have now seen some of the most important claims Heidegger makes about 
Dasein’s moods, which puts us in a good position to question Heidegger’s claim 
that his work is not philosophical anthropology. What is important to bear in 
mind is Heidegger’s conception of his own project as an analysis of Dasein, and 
the incontestable fact that human existence is a case of Dasein. When Heide-
gger analyses Dasein, he is doing so from his own perspective of his existence 
as a human being. The structures he identifies are ones that structure his own 
existence and human existence in general. He may be analysing human beings 
only insofar as they are cases of Dasein, but this is nonetheless true. Anything that 
applies truly to Dasein applies truly to human beings, because human beings are Dasein. 
There is nothing that can be said truly of Dasein’s existence that is not true of 
human existence, and discovering true things about the nature and structure of 
human existence is precisely the aim of a philosophical anthropology. If Heide-
gger is successful in disclosing anything true about Dasein at any point, he has 
engaged in philosophical anthropology, even if he is not keen on admitting it.
With this in mind, let’s consider some of the claims Heidegger makes about 
moods. This list is not exhaustive, and there is room for debate about whether 
or not these are all separate claims, but it is sufficient for our current purposes.
(1)  Moods are fundamentally disclosive: they are part of the process through 
which we make sense of the world and disclose the things in it as mean-
ingful on a pre-rational, pre-linguistic level.
(2)  Moods disclose ‘how we are doing’, providing an affective context to ex-
perience our existence through at a particular time, and be disposed a 
certain way towards it. 
(3)  Without the fundamental disclosure of moods, the forms of disclosure 
associated with reasoning and knowing would not be possible. 
(4)  Moods constitute the different ways we can be disposed to our existence.
(5)  Moods disclose our ‘thrownness’. 
(6)  Certain varieties of mood, like anxiety and boredom, reveal information 
not about specific things in the world, but about our being-in-the-world as 
such, thereby conveying insights to us about what it means to be the kind 
of entity we are. 
(7)  These insights concern our freedom and role in the creation and mainte-
nance of the significance of our worlds.
HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF MOODS  139
These are claims that, if true, would apply generally to human beings and their 
experience of moods, stating true things about the nature and structure of human 
existence – they therefore would be appropriately classed as philosophical-an-
thropological. Perhaps they are not all true, but even if they are not, Heidegger’s 
work still gives us (at the very least) an attempt at philosophical anthropology, 
because he is reflecting on his experience and attempting to deduce general 
truths about it that would apply to all human beings. These are all claims that 
speak to what it is like to be a human being, to experience the kind of existence 
human beings have, and would contribute to an understanding of the structures 
of human existence.
We do not necessarily need these claims to be true to make the argument that 
Heidegger is doing a kind of philosophical anthropology, we just need to examine 
the kind of claims he is making and what kind of project he is engaged in. Based 
on what I have said, I think it is evident that Heidegger is mistaken to be dis-
tancing himself so sharply from philosophical anthropology, given the powerful 
potential his work has for contributing to it, and for benefitting our understanding 
of the human experience. But the stronger argument is certainly possible to make: 
Heidegger does manage to state true things about moods, and therefore manages 
to successfully contribute to philosophical anthropology. I will focus on one in 
closing my argument. Surely one the achievements of Being and Time (and one of 
the things it spends most of its time doing) is showing that our most basic way of 
engaging with the world is not one of knowing, reasoning or rationality. We in fact 
have a deeper, pre-reflective, more primal way of being in the world that makes 
these former ways of being possible. Moods would quite plausibly be an integral 
part of this primal sense-making process, and a constitutive structure for the way 
we exist. There is therefore much value in Heidegger’s working-out of the idea 
that moods are ‘fundamentally disclosive’, and perhaps a lot of truth. But if there 
is, it is truth that contributes to philosophical anthropology, and Heidegger’s anal-
ysis of Dasein as a whole should be read as such a contribution. It is at its most 
productive when understood this way, and he gave us no convincing reasons for 
its essentially differing from philosophical anthropology.
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